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Abstract. How to avoid a second wave of COVID-19 after reopening the
economy is a pressing question. The extremely high basic reproductive
number R0 (5.7 to 6.4, shown in new studies) of SARS-CoV-2 further
complicates the challenge. Here we assess effects of Social distancing 2.0,
i.e. proximity alert (to maintain inter-personal distance) plus privacy-
preserving contact tracing. To solve the dual task, we develop an open
source mobile app. The app uses a Bluetooth-based, decentralized contact
tracing platform over which the anonymous user ID cannot be linked
by the government or a third party. Modeling results show that a 50%
adoption rate of Social distancing 2.0, with privacy-preserving contact
tracing, would suffice to decrease the R0 to less than 1 and prevent the
resurgence of COVID-19 epidemic.
1 Introduction
The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has caused 6,535,354 con-
firmed cases and 387,155 deaths worldwide by June 5, 2020 [1]. To limit the
person-to-person transmission of its causative agent, SARS-CoV-2, governments
imposed restrictive social distancing orders for mass quarantine at home (“lock-
down”) [2, 3] along with rapid scaling-up of SARS-CoV-2 testing to detect and
isolate infectious persons [4, 5]. The combined effect of these interventions suc-
cessfully slowed the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in South Korea, Europe, Japan,
and the United States, with marked decrease in numbers of new cases and deaths
[3, 5, 6]. However, modeling results predict that the COVID-19 epidemic will
rebound after lifting of social distancing restriction . States or countries which
chose to end the lock-down early already experienced a resurgence in the numbers
of new COVID-19 cases [6]. How to safely reopen the economy and simultaneously
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avoid a second wave of COVID-19 epidemic now becomes a pressing question for
which there is still no clear answer.
Universal SARS-CoV-2 testing alone will not suffice to break the chains of
ongoing transmission because SARS-CoV-2-infected persons start to be infectious
2–2.5 days before the onset of clinical symptoms [7-10]. To block this presymp-
tomatic transmission, it is necessary to conduct contact tracing to inform those
who had close contact with SARS-CoV-2-tested-positive persons (defined as:
within 6 feet, for ≥15 minutes, during the infectious period back to 48 hours
before the onset of symptoms) to stay at home and avoid close contacts with
others for 14 days [11, 12]. Since timeliness is of critical importance, instant digital
contact tracing (through a contact-tracing app which records close contacts and
notifies those people immediately upon a positive SARS-CoV-2 testing result)
has been proposed as a powerful strategy to control the COVID-19 epidemic
after the lift of lock-down [11].
Nevertheless, to date, privacy concerns continue to delay contact tracing apps
in the United States [13]. In countries where COVID-19 contact tracing apps
have been approved, the uptake remains low (25% in Singapore, two months
after launch, despite a target level of 75%) [14, 15]. Surveys found that privacy
concerns and the distrust towards governments are major reasons behind this low
adoption rate [15]. The passive role of users (waiting a notification from someone
unknown) is not appealing, either.
Moreover, to achieve sustained suppression of epidemic, interventions need
to reduce the absolute value of basic reproductive number R0 (the number of
secondary cases generated by an infectious case in the absence of herd immunity)
of SARS-CoV-2 to less than 1 [11]. Initial efforts to measure R0 of SARS-CoV-2,
based on epidemiological data in Wuhan, China, yielded estimates ranging from
2.2 to 2.7 [16, 17] which became the basis of previous modeling studies to assess
the impact of interventions. However, new analyses of data across China found
that SARS-CoV-2 is much more contagious than previously thought, with an R0
as high as 5.7 [17]. This updated R0 estimate is in line with the very high second
attack rate (53.3%–59.4%) following exposure at community gatherings [18, 19]
and the extremely fast growth rate of COVID-19 cases in the United States (from
the initial imported cases in late January [20] to more than 1.8 million confirmed
cases in late May 2020 [6] over a four-month period, with an R0 estimate of 6.4,
95% confidence interval: 6.0 to 6.8, see Fig. 1). Digital contact tracing to control
epidemic under these new, much higher R0 estimates has not been assessed.
Taiwan successfully controlled COVID-19 through early border control (14-
day entry quarantine), moderate social distancing, SARS-CoV-2 testing, and
contact tracing, with only 443 confirmed cases and 7 deaths by June 5, 2020
[21, 22]. Artificial intelligence-based information technology plays an central
role behind the highly efficient implementation of these interventions [22-25].
Since early May 2020, the government has been contemplating how to reopen
the society safely. Experts agreed that the privacy and data safety problems
of using digital contact tracing must be solved. Furthermore, given the high
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Fig. 1: COVID-19 epidemic curve in the United States. Data [6] are
numbers of daily reported cases in log scale (curve in pink color) or linear scale
(curve in black color). The epidemic curve followed an exponential growth from
early to mid-March 2020 (curve in red color). The dot line (in red color) shows a
linear regression over time (R2 = 0.99) for numbers of cases (in log scale) during
this exponential phase, indicating an exponential growth rate of 0.30/day and a
doubling time of 2.3 days. SIER model-fitting (see Supplementary material for
details) yields an estimated R0 of 6.4 (95% confidence interval: 6.0 to 6.8).
contagiousness of SARS-CoV-2, digital contact tracing needs to be augmented
by additional protective measures.
We propose a new initiative, Social distancing 2.0, in which privacy-preserving
contact tracing is supplemented with digital proximity alert to help people actively
and voluntarily maintain safe inter-personal distance [26] after end of government-
enforced compulsory social distancing orders (i.e. Social distancing 1.0). To solve
the dual task, Taiwan AI Lab (https://covirus.cc/) developed an open source
mobile app, Taiwan Social Distancing Application (TSD app) [27].
2 Taiwan Social Distancing App
Here we explain how privacy-preserving proximity alert and contact tracing is
achieved in TSD app. We then evaluate the impact of Social distancing 2.0 on
the R0 and trajectory of COVID-19 epidemic.
Proximity Alert between TSD Users The TSD app, installed on mobile
phones, communicates with other TSD clients by exchanging hashed ID via
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) broadcast. The TSD app will calculate and record
both distance and contact duration of nearby TSD clients. The app will send
a proximity alert to remind the users to maintain safe inter-personal distance
when another TSD client comes close to less than 6 feet for ≥ 15 minutes.
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Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing At the core of the TSD app is a
privacy-preserving contact tracing module [27]. The tracing method is designed
based on analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of existing public algorithms
[28-33], such as Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing from EPFL
[28], Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing from Google and Apple [29], as well as
BlueTrace from Singapore Government Technology Agfency [30]. The TSD app
meets the requirement of European Union General Data Protection Regulation
(GPDR) [31]. Unlike other contact tracing apps, the TSD app uses a Bluetooth-
based, decentralized contact tracing platform over which the anonymous user ID
cannot be linked by the government or the third party. Each TSD app compares
the public list of infected hashed IDs with its contact history on device and alerts
the user if a high-risk contact history is detected. Data Policy: We detail the data
policy of TSD in four key aspects, including what data are collected, who can
access these data, how the data are used, and when the life cycle of data ends. To
protect the individual privacy, no personally identifiable information is collected
by the app. TSD records only anonymous hashed IDs received, and stores their
rough timestamp in the local device (the cell phone). The collected data, also
known as the contact history, will never leave the device, and are kept for 28
days. When any of TSD users are confirmed as infected, they can provide public
health organizations with the anonymous IDs used to broadcast themselves in
the last 28 days. The public health organizations publish a list of IDs broadcast
by known infected users, while the list is periodically updated at a defined time
interval. These anonymous IDs cannot be linked back to the individual and will
be destroyed after 7 days. The TSD app routinely checks the published list of
infected anonymous IDs to match its local contact history and alerts its user
when a high-risk contact history is found.
Contact Tracing Algorithm Driven by privacy preserving, the algorithm is
designed based on the following five principles: 1) Notify people at risk of infection
and give guidance on the next steps efficiently; 2) Minimize the amount of data
collected in the process; 3) Prevent abuse of data thoroughly; 4) Avoid central
tracking of non-infected users; and 5) Dismantle the app automatically after
the outbreak is over. Registration Free: The algorithm requires no registration
step before using TSD to trace user’s contact history. All the collected data are
generated by the app itself and cannot be linked back to the user. However,
additional personal information might be needed when a user is contacted by
public health organizations under the condition of infection or other emergencies.
Anonymous IDs: Since the algorithm relies on the BLE protocol, the length
of an anonymous ID is thus limited by the protocol’s payload size and should not
overburden the local storage of the device. The length of a generated anonymous
key is 128 bits. To avoid location tracking via exploring broadcasted IDs, the app
must frequently change its anonymous ID. Anonymous IDs expire in 15 minutes,
and at most 96 unique, secure, anonymous IDs will be generated each day. The
short rotation interval is adopted to prevent large-scale location tracking and
avoid linking anonymous IDs back to an individual based on other real-world
information. The TSD app stores all IDs it generates in the local device storage;
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however, IDs older than 28 days will be discarded for personal data protection
and keep storage usage at a reasonable level.
Contact History: More crucially, the TSD app also locally records each ID it
received via BLE broadcast. A timestamp is also logged. Each contact record
requires 46 bytes (44 bytes hashed base64 string ID, 1 byte timestamp and 1
byte RSSI). Assuming that 10k IDs are received daily, about 12.28MB is required
to save 28 days’ worth of data for contact history. Report when Infected: When
TSD users are tested positive, they first hash the IDs they have broadcast in the
past 28 days using a crypto-secure hash function (e.g., SHA256). After providing
basic contact information to a public health organization, they can upload the
hashed anonymous IDs with an authorization code to the backend server. The
server aggregates all newly infected hashed IDs, removes outdated IDs, and
then publishes a new alert list to be downloaded. The backend is simple storage
for infected IDs with no additional processing. For efficiency, the list can be
shared via CDN or distributed servers, which lower the bandwidth cost of the
backend. The backend server will also remove infected IDs older than 7 days to
reduce resource usage and prevent abusive use of data, while still being valuable
about containing the outbreak. To further anonymize the data when the infection
case number is small, we continue to explore potential solutions such as adding
spurious tokens or introducing mixing servers. Risk Notification: Each day, the
TSD app will download an updated list of infected hashed IDs from the server
and detect matches between the list and the local contact history. If a match is
found, the user’s risk score is calculated based on estimated distance and contact
duration. It will notify the user and provide health care information when the
calculated risk score is high.
Security and Privacy Like other software systems, the TSD app could face
a variety of adversarial threats and security concern is a top priority in designing
the algorithm. Due to the nature of the BLE broadcast, adversaries can always
record a received message and replay it back to the public at different locations
before the ID is replaced. If the owner of the ID is diagnosed as infected, the
replayed message will create multiple false positives to other TSD users. However,
such an online attack demands large scale of device deployment to record infected
IDs before they are published, and thus requires extensive budget which is not
feasible to small-scale adversaries. The security of TSD can also be challenged
from perverse infected users by hiding their contact history via removing the app,
refusing to share their past IDs, disabling BLE broadcast whenever they want,
or simply ignoring the alert sent by the application. Finally, adversarial attacks
such as jamming attack could cause deny of service for the BLE-based app. To
strengthen TSD against the various security attacks is still an ongoing research
effort, and the progress will be constantly updated.
Privacy preserving can be better understood through two graph models ac-
counting for global interaction and proximity information. The global interaction
graph (Fig. 2) reflects the social relationships of all users in the TSD system. The
interaction between two users is revealed only to themselves. Infected users will
not share their contact history with the authority but the past anonymous IDs
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Fig. 2: Global Interaction Graph reflects the social relationships among all users.
Fig. 3: A Proximity Graph indicates those who (colored as orange) are within
the concerned contact range of an anonymous infected user (colored as red).
to the public health organizations. Under such a design, no party can learn the
global interaction graph from the system. The proximity graph (Fig. 3) encodes
contacts between infected users and other individuals, which is essential to the
contact tracing application. However, only a relevant subset (i.e., related to
infected users) of the proximity graph is revealed to each user. Users will not
share their subgraph with other users or authorities. Notice that the anonymous
IDs in our design are unlinkable. Only the device that generated these keys knows
their relationship. When a user is confirmed infected, the anonymous IDs they
have used in the last 28 days will be shared with the public. The user’s device
will rotate to a new set of IDs after the user is diagnosed as infected. Hence,
those published infected IDs cannot be used to link back to the user. For users
other than infected ones, their data will not leave their device at all, and thus no
information about them is leaked to any party.
3 Impacts of Taiwan Social Distancing App
Impact of Social Distancing 2.0 on R0 We applied an SEIR model to simu-
late the effect of Social distancing 2.0 on R0 of SARS-CoV-2 (see Supplementary
Material). The model followed the general analytical framework of Grad and
Lipsitch et al. [34] as well as Giordano et al. [5]. New empirical studies now
provided more accurate estimates on key parameters, including basic reproduc-
tive number before interventions [17], pre-symptomatic infectious period [8], and
infectious duration after the onset of illnesses [9]. New systematic reviews and
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meta-analyses provided precise estimates on the protective efficacy of maintaining
a > 6 feet ( 1.8 meter) inter-personal distance against SARS-CoV-2 transmission
[26]. (See Table 1.) R0 is estimated by the following formula: (see Supplementary
Material for details)
Total R0 =
β(1− fp)
{[
σ(1−qA)
µ+σ
]
−
[
t×
(
d+γ·qH
µ+γ+d
)]}
µ+ γ + d
+
β(1− fp)
(
σ·qA
µ+σ
)
µ+ γ
(1)
The first term in (1) is the contribution from symptomatic patients (including
transmissions occurred in the pre-symptomatic infectious period), while the
second term is the contribution from asymptomatic infected persons. We note
here that the various symbols in (1) respectively represent:
– β is the transmission coefficient.
– f is levels of social restriction (Social distancing 1.0) or adoption rate (Social
distancing 2.0 app).
– p is compliance (Social distancing 1.0) or protective efficacy of distancing
(Social distancing 2.0).
– 1/σ is latency period (before the start of pre-symptomatic infectious period).
– qA is the proportion of infected persons who remain asymptomatic throughout
the course.
– 1/µ is life expectancy in the United States.
– t is adoption rate of contact tracing app (without proximity alert) or Social dis-
tancing 2.0 app (with dual-function of proximity alert and privacy-preserving
contact tracing).
– 1/d is mean duration from symptom onset to isolation.
– 1/γ is mean duration of infectiousness.
– qH is proportion of symptomatic patients who developed several illness and
need hospitalization.
Fig. 4 shows that, when baseline R0 is at the level of 6.0, a 90% or higher
uptake rate of single function contact tracing apps (without proximity alert) will
be required to bring the R0 back to below 1 after lift of lock-down. In contrast, a
50% adoption rate of dual function Social distancing 2.0 app (contact tracing plus
proximity) would suffice to decrease R0 to less than 1 and ensure the sustained
suppression of COVID-19 after reopening.
Impact of Social Distancing 2.0 on Trajectory of Epidemic Fig. 5 shows
that, consistent with previous studies [3, 34], COVID-19 epidemic will rebound
after reopening. The second wave of epidemic will have a magnitude even greater
than that of the first wave. The launch and rollout of Social distancing 2.0 app to
an adoption rate of 50% after re-opening prevents the second wave of COVID-19
pandemic. Sensitivity analysis shows that moderate variations in Social distancing
2.0 apps adoption rate (from 45% to 55%) does not alter its protective effect
against a resurgence of COVID-19.
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Fig. 4: Quantifying R0 under Social distancing 2.0. Simulations are con-
ducted with a baseline R0 at the level of 6.0 (Fig. 1) [17], under a setting with
universal rapid SARS-CoV-2 testing that ensures rapid diagnosis and isolation
of symptomatic patients (mean duration from the symptoms onset to isolation:
1 day). Columns show levels of compulsory Social distancing 1.0 (% decrease
in social contacts). Rows show levels of uptake for Social distancing 2.0 apps
(% adoption rates). Rapid isolation of symptomatic patients alone decreases R0
from 6 to 2.18. The R0 can be further reduced to 0.71, with epidemic control,
by restricting 75% social contacts under Social distancing 1.0. Nevertheless, R0
will easily rebound to values higher than 1 after easing social distancing 1.0
restriction to 50% or lower. Left panel: Effect of digital contact tracing alone
(without proximity alert to keep a >6-feet inter-personal distance). When baseline
R0 is at the level of 6.0, a 90% or higher uptake rate for contact tracing apps will
be required to bring the R0 back to below 1 after the end of Social distancing 1.0.
Right panel: Effect of Social distancing 2.0 (digital contact tracing plus proximity
alert to keep a >6-feet inter-personal distance). A 50% adoption rate of such
apps would suffice to decrease R0 to less than 1, with sustained suppression of
epidemic, after the end of Social distancing 1.0.
4 Discussions
Our Social distancing 2.0 initiative simultaneously addresses two unmet and
seemingly conflicting societal needs: first, avoiding a second wave of COVID-
19 after reopening the economy; second, upholding privacy, data security, and
democratic values in a time of pandemic [35]. Proximity alert function in Social
distancing 2.0 apps turns user experience from passively waiting bad news into
actively protecting oneself and others, while privacy-preserving contact tracing
prevents abuse of digital tracing by authoritarian regimes or malicious hackers.
Dual function Social distancing 2.0 apps suppress the COVID-19 epidemic at
50% adoption rate, in contrast to the more than 90% uptake needed for single
function contact tracing app.
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Fig. 5: Trajectory of COVID-19 epidemic without or with Social dis-
tancing 2.0. Simulations are conducted with a baseline R0 at the level of 6.0
(Fig. 1) (17), in a 10-million population area. The green line shows numbers of
daily new infections when the pandemic runs its nature course. Compulsory social
distancing (SD 1.0) (lock-down) to restrict social contacts by 75% started on day
27 (marked by arrow), along with universal rapid SARS-CoV-2 testing for prompt
isolation of symptomatic patients to achieve a final mean duration of 1 day from
symptom onset to isolation, (both interventions are rolled out over a 4-week
period) flattens the epidemic curve. The red line shows that SD 1.0 plus testing
decreases the peak incidence of new infections by more than 90%. COVID-19
epidemic rebounds after gradually reopening started from day 127 (marked by
arrow) over a 4-weeks period, causing a second wave of COVID-19 epidemic with
a magnitude larger than that of the first wave (red line, right half). The launch
and rollout of Social distancing 2.0 app (SD 2.0) to an adoption rate of 50%
over a 4-week period after the start of re-opening, nevertheless, prevents the
second wave of COVID-19 pandemic (blue line). Moreover, SD 2.0 will continue
to suppress COVID-19 until its elimination (when numbers of daily new infection
becomes less than 1). Sensitivity analysis shows that moderate variations in SD
2.0 apps adoption rate (from 45% to 55%) does not alter the protective effect of
SD 2.0 against a resurgence of COVID-19 pandemic (blue shadow area).
Social distancing is a de facto practice to curb the outbreak of an infectious
pandemic. However, it extremely disrupts the regular operations of current society.
We propose that with a careful algorithm design, the popular use of a privacy-
preserving contact tracing system such as TSD can help boost the effect of
social distancing and expedite the progress to society reopening. In addition,
deploying such a contact tracing system in the early stage of reopening can
be thought of as implementing an implicit form of social distancing with the
advantage of carrying on daily life as usual. A new form of social distancing
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with privacy-preserving contact tracing is expected to contribute significantly in
tackling the possible resurgence of the coronavirus disease in late 2020 or in the
event of a new pandemic in the upcoming future.
Table 1: Key parameters of the SEIR model for SARS-CoV-2 transmission and
pathogenesis
Parameters Value (mean) References
Pre-intervention basic reproductive number
R0 of SARS-CoV-2
6.0
5.7 [17]
6.4 (Fig. 1, this study)
Incubation period (from infection to the
onset of illnesses) 5.2 days [16]
Pre-symptomatic infectious period before
the onset of illnesses 2.5 days [8]
Latent period (from infection to the onset
of infectiousness)
2.7 days
5.2 days (incubation period)
[16] minus 2.5 days (pre-
symptomatic infectious pe-
riod before the onset of ill-
nesses) [8, 9]
Infectious period after the onset of illnesses 6.0 days [9]
Proportion of severe/critical cases among
all infected persons
19% [36]
Infection-related mortality among
sever/critical cases
12% [36]
Proportion of infected persons who remain
asymptomatic throughout course
5% [37]
Protective efficacy of maintaining a less
than 15 minutes and > 6 feet physical dis-
tance during contacts, in term of reduction
in probability of transmission per contact
90% [26]
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